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Abstract 
This paper offers a proposal for a thesis examining the relationship between organizational 
structure and workplace surveillance. Primarily, surveillance practices falling under a top-down 
control category will be considered. To draw conclusions about the relationship, an explicit case 
study will be conducted to comparatively analyze workplace surveillance practices at Amazon 
and Uber. The goal is to evaluate whether the surveillance practices deployed by these 
companies are mostly similar, implying the underlying organizational structure is agnostic of 
surveillance and a deeper overlap is the root, or mostly different, implying the underlying 
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While thinking about my thesis topic, I began with my curiosity surrounding democracy 
in the workplace and a worker-cooperative organizational structure. In accordance with my 
pursuit of a BS in Computer Science, I wanted to connect my business research with technology. 
Ultimately, I settled with Workplace Surveillance as a broad topic of interest to examine the 
history, causes, and effects of pernicious, invasive practices in the workplace. 
 Surveillance in the workplace has gained prominence over the past several years, 
particularly due to technological advances that make possible a detailed view of workers’ 
behavior. Although technology broadens the scope of surveillance, its existence and underlying 
motivations pre-date our “age of information.” As workplace surveillance continues to evolve, its 
impacts on the daily lives of workers grows, and with changes in our working environment (i.e. 
changes in organizational structure), surveillance is a key component of maintaining hierarchy 
and control throughout a standard organization. Rooted in my interest in democratizing the 
workplace, I am curious to examine the relationship between organizational structure and 





Surveillance in the workplace is a divisive topic. Some advocate for it as a beneficial, 
mutual tradeoff to prevent things like “time-theft” or misuse of resources (Rosenbalt et al., 2014, 
p. 14). Information on surveillance is often withheld or not made clear to employees, which 
exacerbates trust issues (Ball, 2010, p. 91). Today, we see these issues of big technology 
companies surveilling their employees. Not only do these surveillance strategies yield negative 
effects for workers, but they are also used to undermine worker organizing efforts. This step 
diminishes the ability for employees to collectively advocate for improved conditions, including 
demands to rid the workplace of inhumane surveillance strategies. 
The importance of the topic stems from the effects of surveillance on workers 
themselves: it damages worker wellbeing and removing surveillance can allow for furthering the 
voice of workers within organizations (Ball, 2010, p. 100). Different forms of workplace 
surveillance cause different detrimental effects. For example, in a warehouse setting such as at 
Amazon, workers have been subject to keeping up with “the Rate:” employees are expected to 
stay above their item-moving rate, which is tracked throughout their workday, and this leads to 
employees needing to decide, “should I use the bathroom or keeping working?” (AI Now, 2019). 
Beyond personal wellbeing, workplace surveillance can be damaging to trust and morale within 
an organization, and employees interacting with electronic devices intended to maximize their 
own production can foster feelings of distress (Attewell, 1985, p. 95).  
In response to the conditions created by workplace surveillance, there have been many 
organizing efforts over the years, and listening to these workers is crucial for understanding the 
problem at hand. Recent unionization efforts by Amazon warehouse workers in the US and 




unprecedented organizing in their region (Press, 2020). Additionally for Amazon, there were 
global blackouts as a means of protest in over a dozen countries, and among the demands 
included ceasing the sale of surveillance tools and revoking terminations of employees who 
spoke out (Gurley, 2020). One particular case of the latter was from earlier this year, when an 
Amazon employee was speaking out about COVID-19 conditions, and Amazon’s PR team 
plotted against his efforts and tried to frame him as “not smart or articulate” (Blest, 2020). 
Interestingly enough, there is increasing solidarity among the “white-collar” and “blue-collar” 
sides of these tech companies (as seen during Google’s 2019 walkout), likely due to the fact they 
are both surveilled as a means of exploitation, albeit the surveillance may take different forms. 
Listening to organizing workers properly frames the surveillance problem and the necessity to 
address it. 
Despite the negative effects of surveillance and organizing efforts by employees, big tech 
corporations continue to double down on surveillance practices: both conducting their own 
surveillance and building surveillance technologies. Amazon attempted to delay the NLRB 
hearings scheduled from unionizing efforts in Bessemer, Alabama (Greene, 2020). Additionally, 
there have been instances revealed where they appear to use careful language about how 
managers treat unions, such as their claim in a 2018 Whole Foods training video, “we are not 
anti-union, but we are not neutral either” (Menegus, 2018). Furthermore, Amazon was caught a 
few months ago with Pinkerton-esque job openings, intending to track “labor organizing threats,” 
although the job postings were removed following public response (Franceschi-Bicchierai, 
2020). Google also found itself in hot water earlier this month after being exposed for spying on 
internal organizers (Schiffer, 2020), and Microsoft continues to create surveillance tech, with 




“productivity score” (Hern, 2020). This corporate behavior makes sense as surveillance is being 
used to attain profit goals; however, there is a clear gap in an understanding of employee needs. 
As such, the issue of surveillance is difficult to overcome under the present conditions, and 
alternative methods of organizing could be necessary. While this paper will not directly outline 
next steps for organizing, I hope to provide a meaningful analysis of how organizational 
structure and surveillance are historically related, influence the set of possible organizing actions, 
and show that addressing the underlying organizational structure itself will be a necessary 





To grapple with the surveillance issues in the workplace today, there are a few motivating 
questions: 
 
How does organizational structure shape workplace surveillance? 
 From a higher level of abstraction, it is difficult to investigate the causes of workplace 
surveillance and the problems it creates. For this reason, a deeper examination of the connections 
with organizational structure is necessary. Within the context of organizational structure, 
supplementary questions arise: what are the key characteristics of an organization’s structure that 
influence workplace surveillance, and does the extent to which employees are involved in the 
decision-making process make a difference? 
 
How does the technology of the times influence workplace surveillance?  
 Additionally, influences on workplace surveillance exceed organizational structure, and 
the technology available to management impacts the ways that workplace surveillance manifests. 
Considering the rapid changes in technology since the start of the 20th century, the corresponding 
changes in workplace surveillance is interesting to explore. Have the underlying purposes 
remained the same, only to be amplified and realized in new ways by advanced technology? 
 
How do organizational structure and technology affect resistance to workplace surveillance?  
The actions of workers subject to surveillance are limited by external pressures that 
threaten their wellbeing and the level of internal awareness of pernicious practices. 
Organizational structure and technology both serve as influential factors in the set of steps 
workers can take to resist workplace activities they oppose. Defining this relationship is relevant 




Research Question and Hypothesis 
Given the time frame of this project, all three motivating questions would not be 
effectively researched. Instead, this paper will focus on answering, does organizational structure 
impact the types of workplace surveillance utilized by technology corporations? The other two 
points are important areas for comparison, but they will not be directly covered in this research. 
This topic is generally broad, so the approach will be to perform a comparative case study 
between workplace surveillance practices at Amazon and Uber. More specifically, the research 
question can be worded, how do the different organizational structures of Amazon (centralized 
warehouses) and Uber (distributed gig employees) influence their workplace surveillance 
practices? Prior to generating and analyzing results, the hypothesis is yes, organizational 
structure affects workplace surveillance methods and will yield significantly different practices 
at Amazon and Uber. The reasons for choosing Amazon and Uber will be explained in the 
Methodology section. 
This paper aims to discover distinguishing features of Amazon’s and Uber’s respective 
workplace surveillance practices that are representative of their differing organizational 
structures. Aligned with present approaches to solutions, this paper hopes to yield insightful 
contributions to crafting and conceptualizing countermeasures to surveillance. Additionally, the 
goals of the paper are slightly expanded to address broader issues regarding the treatment of 
workers by large technology corporations, and how exploitation fuels the continued problem of 
surveillance. By dissecting the surveillance at Amazon and Uber, this paper hopes to discover 
important insights to spark future research into methods of resistance, by workers, against 






The general focus of the thesis is informed by the present literature and existing 
theoretical framing for surveillance in the workplace. Kristie Ball’s key paper provides an 
informative overview of workplace surveillance, touching on various important elements. Figure 
1 shows numerous techniques prevalent among workplace surveillance (Ball, 2010, p. 90). Since 
these methods are not extensively expanded upon in Ball’s paper, they serve as further grounds 
for exploration from a historical perspective. Many of these methods are only applicable given 
certain organizational structures. For example, a distributed workforce of independent 
contractors conducting deliveries would not best be suited for surveillance via keystrokes or 
telephone calls. Additionally, important research can be done surrounding how these techniques 
have manifested over time in relation to the organizational structure. Using telephone calls again, 
this method of data collection arguably arose from the development of an organizational 
structure present within a call-center, where management is particularly keen on how employees 
are communicating over the phone to customers. Importantly, technological progress is also an 
element of changing surveillance techniques. 
Ball also outlines the intentions of workplace surveillance (as previously mentioned) and 
discusses claims of mediating negative effects. Among these mediation strategies include task 
design, supervisory style, additional feedback channels, employee predispositions, and broader 
organizational factors (Ball, 2010, p. 94-96). Most of these criteria take an approach of 
modifying procedural elements of an organization and seldomly addresses the negative effects by 
looking at the underlying structure; however, in the final point, Ball brings up the work of Paul 




Attewell’s 1985 paper lays out various theories regarding workplace surveillance, many 
of which could be expanded upon given technological advancements and changes in 
organizational structures in recent years. Similar to Ball’s (2010) discussions on social processes 
influence surveillance (p. 96), Attewell’s antecedent work mentions organizational culture 
(Attewell, 1985, p. 88). Both elements are critical to understanding surveillance; however, the 
primary focus of my thesis will be to look at other structural features of an organization such as 
the types of jobs, centralization of jobs, and hierarchical management. Importantly, Attewell’s 
work identifies several areas in which I would like to expand upon. Briefly, Attewell gives a 
historical perspective for corporations and surveillance practices, citing a study done where firms 
with adversarial labor relations ended up using surveillance for further exploitation whereas 
firms with non-adversarial relations consulted employees on the issue and did not use 
surveillance to realize a sweatshop production style (1985, p. 88). This relationship between the 
firm’s structure and its employees is a key element to examine going forward and raises a good 
question as to whether this trend still holds today. 
Additionally, Attewell describes two theoretical perspectives and posits that the desire to 
surveil white-collar or clerical workers transcends technological capabilities. The neo-Marxist 
perspective views surveillance as too good to pass up for management as a tool for exploitation, 
and the primary method of countering surveillance needs to be through labor pressure (Attewell, 
1985, p. 88). “Contingency Theory” claims that clerical work will only face increased levels of 
surveillance when the employees are “central to profitability” (Attewell, 1985, p. 91). Finally, 
Attewell lays out his claim that despite the appearance of increased surveillance of clerical 
workers due to new technologies, the information gathered would be the same using prior 




same principles as described in “Contingency Theory” as well as other factors as outlined in 
Figure 2 (Attewell, 1985, p. 97). Ultimately, Attewell’s final model in Figure 2 convey that the 
rise of technology will not directly influence the extent to which speed-up monitoring is 
perpetuated in the workplace, and this leaves good room to explore further. 
Much has changed in the 35 years since Attewell’s paper, and while the theories outlined 
are important, new developments in the workplace and technology could potentially counter 
some of the claims. The theories described tie together important elements to analyze: 
organizational structure, labor relations, methods of resistance, and history. The dual notion of 
surveillance being “too good to pass up” and its prominence when certain jobs are central to 
profitability can be applied elsewhere. With the rise of the gig economy, these theories could be 
expanded to encompass a decentralized workforce, something that’s become a supplement or 
substitute for many people working clerical jobs. It’s also important to note observations that 
new technologies make new forms of monitoring possible and prevalent (Rosenbalt et al., 2014, 
p. 2). An important question to ask of this, though, is whether the new technologies are bringing 
new purposes to surveillance or amplifying existing uses. As Attewell’s points work out, new 
technologies were only theorized to amplify. Approaching this space from a historical 
perspective is important to see whether these theories still hold, and generally in the literature, 
there is a lack of analyses that consider temporal change (Rosenblat et al., 2014, p. 15). 
As part of her critique of surveillance, Ball mentions the methods of resistance in a 
generalized manner (2010): finding a “gap” in the relationship between the employees being 
surveilled and the managers doing the surveilling (p. 99-101). This “gap” is a primary method of 
resistance as employees can choose to enter these gaps as a form of non-participation. For 




avoid sending messages to each other or send messages inconsistently and inaccurately to mess 
with the monitoring expectations. Ball directly discusses another example (2010), blog websites 
for employees to display negative feelings about employers (p. 94). As these sites would be 
beyond the reach of an organization’s surveillance, they, too, are seen as a “gap” in which 
employees can resist. Notably, since the writing of this paper, surveillance tactics have involved 
corporate surveillance of external platforms to inhibit employees speaking out. Thus, there is 
room here for exploring how these gaps have changed over time in conjunction with an 
organization’s structural setting. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
To be used in the comparative analysis case studies, the theoretical framework will be 
adapted from existing theories in the literature as previously described. The key vector of 
comparison will be organizational structure and workplace surveillance practices across different 
firms. Although the thesis will focus on the relationship between organizational structure and 
surveillance techniques and how they influence each other, the technological element is 
important to tie in as discussed in various pieces of the literature. Attewell’s work supported 
evidence that technology should not be a factor in determining whether surveillance is used; 
however, due to the more limited scope compared to the motivating questions, this cannot be as 
effectively explored as in this research’s cases for comparisons. While researching different 
forms of surveillance, Ball’s general categorizations, shown in Figure 1, will be important 
considerations. A subset will be explicitly used for the discovery process, investigating different 
elements of surveillance at Amazon and Uber. In particular, surveillance related to performance 
and behavior will be the most important for understanding what workers are subjected to at 





 To address the broader motivating question about the relationship between organizational 
structure and surveillance, Amazon and Uber were selected to conduct a narrow and descriptive 
study. Amazon and Uber were chosen due to their clear differences in organizational structure 
and relevance to workplace surveillance. Amazon’s warehouses and Uber’s app platform will be 
analyzed, and these settings are direct opposites in terms of organizational structure: Amazon’s 
warehouses are centralized with explicit, in-person management, and Uber’s app platform is 
made up of a distributed driver force with elements of remote management. Amazon and Uber 
have also been relevant to recent surveillance news, which will be touched on later in this paper. 
To summarize, Amazon employees in Bessemer, Alabama attempted a unionization vote due to 
harmful working conditions in the warehouse, in which surveillance is a key perpetrator. At the 
end of last year, Uber drove a fierce campaign with Proposition 22 in California to dismantle 
prior legislation classifying drivers as employees, and surveillance played a role in Uber’s 
success as well as drivers’ complaints. These characteristics set up Amazon and Uber to be prime 
targets for surveillance analysis and subjects for testing the hypothesis. 
The primary tool for research will be a case study, conducting a comparative analysis 
between the two firms and their associated surveillance practices. There are three inter-related 
metrics for analyzing a method of surveillance: context, execution, and purpose. Context is the 
environment and conditions in which surveillance is conducted. Organizational structure is a 
large factor in determining the context for surveillance practices, so context is extremely 
different between Amazon and Uber. Execution is the explicit actions taken by managers, 
owners, or their technology to gather data, nudge employees, or monitor. Between Amazon and 




would not damage the validity of the hypothesis. Purpose is the underlying reason for the method 
of surveillance, and it could be explicitly known or inferred based on how the method is 
executed. Differences in purpose are to be expected between Amazon and Uber, and if there are 
many overlapping similarities with purpose, the hypothesis will be swiftly rejected. As an 
example of what this breakdown would look like, we can look to a surveillance method of 
Amazon that will be covered later in the paper: camera monitoring. The context for this method 
of surveillance is Amazon’s centralized warehouse. Camera monitoring is executed by having 
them placed across the warehouse, covering many open spaces. Some purposes of camera 
monitoring include theft prevention and behavioral monitoring done by managers. 
Several existing research documents, press releases, and interviews will be leveraged to 
gather information on surveillance practices for Amazon and Uber. Although present 
corporation-focused surveillance research covers Amazon more than Uber, there is a healthy 
amount of information available for both firms, which should satisfy the needs of this study. 
Once information on surveillance methods is collected, an explicit comparison between 
associated practices at Amazon and Uber will be done, emphasizing execution and purpose. 
Based on those results, there will be a discussion on their meaning and implications for 





Based on various articles, reports, and interviews on practices at Amazon and Uber, there 
is a complete puzzle set regarding the levels of workplace surveillance employed at each firm. 
 
Amazon’s Centralized Warehouse Surveillance 
From the moment warehouse employees enter the building, they are being watched by 
Amazon’s surveillance system. After ensuring the disposal of personal belongings, Amazon’s 
“extensive network of security cameras” track employee movement (Hanley and Hubbard, 2020, 
p. 8). Additionally, since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, this surveillance network 
includes a series of “Distance Assistants,” claiming to prevent workers from being within six feet 
of each other by computationally tracking, measuring, and warning employees of their walking 
behaviors (Vincent, 2020).  Furthermore, warehouse cameras serve as a function on Amazon’s 
union-busting utility-belt: as employees congregate within the warehouse, managers are ready to 
break up clusters to keep workers on task, mitigating natural conversations about shared 
experiences and conditions (Hanley and Hubbard, 2020, p. 12). 
Beyond warehouse-wide camera systems, Amazon utilizes direct forms of surveillance 
on a per-employee basis. The primary method of delivery for this form of surveillance is through 
item scanners held by each employee. Tasks are directly sent to these handheld devices, and 
employees are expected to follow the explicit instructions and keep up with the expected rate 
(Guendelsberger, 2019 and Kelly, 2016). Within the scanners, an employee’s location is tracked 
throughout their working hours, and task completion rates and “Time Off Task'' (TOT) are 
logged. Failure to minimize TOT, adhere to the instructions given for a task, or maintain a rate 
above the expected threshold may lead to sudden, automatic termination (Hanley and Hubbard, 




employees are unaware of what the rate will be until they are notified of falling below that rate 
(Hanley and Hubbard, 2020, p. 12). By several accounts, these practices cause great distress for 
employees (Hanley and Hubbard, 2020, p. 11). Despite this, Amazon continues to expand their 
invasive surveillance efforts, and in the near future, patented wristbands are likely to be seen, 
which track hand movements of employees and deliver vibrations to correct employee movement 
toward an algorithmically pre-determined optimal set of motions (Boyle, 2018). 
 
Uber’s Distributed Gig Surveillance 
 From the moment Uber drivers open the app on their phones, they are being watched by 
Uber’s surveillance system. In recent years, facial recognition technology has been used for 
verification purposes, but drivers have called for its removal due to inaccurate failures leading to 
job losses (Macdonald, 2021). The facial recognition system is not entirely accurate, and it 
disproportionately affects underrepresented groups (Goled, 2021). Beyond ID screenings, drivers 
are subject to consistent GPS location tracking throughout app usage as well as logging of 
driving habits such as speed, acceleration rates, and hard stops (Jamil, 2020, pp. 5, 6). The 
driver’s cell phone is the center of these surveillance elements, and they also receive their direct 
instructions through the phone. Uber algorithmically determines pickups for drivers and expects 
them to follow the optimized set of directions for the ride (Jamil, 2020, p. 3). This algorithm 
comes together with rider reviews and aforementioned surveillance statistics to compile 
performance evaluations for drivers. The performance evaluation process is not transparent, and 
sudden terminations via electronic notifications are not uncommon, which places additional 





 Looking at Amazon and Uber’s respective practices, certain differences can be noted. In 
Amazon warehouses, management interfering with employee communications is unique to the 
setting when compared with Uber. Intuitively, this action makes sense since managers can have 
direct effects on the physical actions of workers with respect to each other in a common space. 
This management interference also aligns with repeated anti-union activities pursued by Amazon 
(Semel, 2021). Although managers intend to keep workers “on task,” the interjection clearly 
prevents workers from discussing shared experiences while in the workplace, which hinders 
processes of building camaraderie and organizing. On the other hand, Uber does not have direct 
physical interventions with employee discussions since their workforce is distributed, and drivers 
cannot as organically consolidate to discuss their conditions. 
 The other primary difference between Amazon and Uber’s practices is the method of 
enabling various forms of surveillance. For Amazon, company-owned hardware (such as the 
handheld item scanners) are the primary channels for surveilling Amazon warehouse workers. 
This gives Amazon a unique level of control over hardware details that can more precisely target 
the firm’s surveillance goals. For Uber, driver-owned hardware (their personal cell phones) is the 
primary channel for surveillance. While Uber is capable of gathering large amounts of data and 
retrieving granular details of a driver’s behavior in-app, the company is more limited in going 
beyond the software capabilities of surveillance. 
 These categories of difference are representative of the differing organizational structures 
of Amazon and Uber. The centralized setting of an Amazon warehouse is conducive to physical 
micromanaging and company hardware; whereas, Uber’s distributed workforce innately relies on 





 Several surveillance practices at Amazon and Uber are similar in their purpose and 
execution. 
➢ Task Completion and Lack of Transparency: 
  Tasks completed are tracked by some mechanism for both Amazon and Uber, and 
expectations for rates of task completion or performance evaluation are hidden from the 
workers. The handheld item scanners in Amazon warehouses are also used for tracking 
task completion, and workers are only aware of their required rates once they receive 
notifications of failing to meet it. Performance evaluations at Uber are similarly non-
transparent, based on an abstract algorithm that takes into account a driver’s adherence to 
instructions, time spent per task, and rider reviews. In both companies, workers are 
burdened with uncertainty regarding their employer expectations. 
➢ Active Location Tracking: 
  Inside warehouses or personal vehicles, workers at both companies experience 
location tracking as a means of monitoring behavior and performance. Item scanners 
within Amazon warehouses alongside the broad system of cameras are used to document 
the movement of employees, their locations with respect to tasks, and time off task. GPS 
data supports Uber’s efforts to track drivers, seeing whether they adhere to predetermined 
directions and other metadata regarding car speed, acceleration rates, and more. 
➢ Explicit Predetermined Instructions: 
  With each task assigned to a warehouse employee or driver, there are explicit 
instructions that are algorithmically predetermined: either designated paths to getting to 




explicit task instructions through the handheld item scanners, and Uber delivers 
associated directions to the driver’s phone (in-app). Both types of workers are also 
expected to adhere to these instructions; otherwise, penalties may be incurred. 
➢ Monitoring Behavior with Cameras and Devices: 
  Surveillance cameras are highly available to monitor employees within Amazon 
warehouses. These cameras are used primarily to ensure employees in-view are on-task. 
Similarly with Uber drivers, facial recognition technology in the phone camera is used for 
monitoring identification requirements, and the phone is used for logging metadata on 
driving behavior to keep in-line with Uber’s vague standards. 
➢ Meeting Protocols: 
  Amazon and Uber both use surveillance to ensure certain protocols are met. Full 
body screening is used by Amazon to prevent theft by warehouse workers, and 
surveillance footage is shown on TVs to set an example of employees who are caught 
stealing (Luckerson, 2016). Similarly, Uber checks driver identification via facial 
recognition. In both cases, the firms have protocols in mind for employees to follow, and 
surveillance is used to physically verify employees are following the given protocol. 
➢ Automated Electronic Termination: 
  While termination in and of itself is not necessarily a form of surveillance, the 
process is informed by the surveillance practices used at Amazon and Uber. Firing 
workers is highly dependent on the data gathered through surveillance. By comparing this 
data with performance metrics or target thresholds, which is also non-transparent, both 
firms use an automated mechanism for many cases of termination. 





 Given the results, the hypothesis can be rejected: Amazon’s and Uber’s workplace 
surveillance practices do not significantly differ alongside their opposing organizational 
structures. Amazon’s centralized warehouses and Uber’s distributed gig workers are subjected to 
much of the same methods of surveillance. This is surprising considering much of the existing 
literature frames surveillance as a key problem within the modern corporation; surveillance is 
meant to be addressable on a corporation-by-corporation basis. Understanding the reason for 
strong similarities between Amazon and Uber requires revisiting surveillance literature, 
expanding this paper’s theoretical scope, and exploring deeper overlaps in organizational 
purpose. 
 
Incorporating Overlooked Theory 
Christian Fuchs’s “Political Economy and Surveillance Theory” is the paper that will 
inform an analysis of the similarities between workplace surveillance at Amazon and Uber. The 
core element of Fuchs’s paper is the viewing surveillance through a Marxist lens and relating 
surveillance to the cycle of capital accumulation. This cycle, represented in Figure 5, is a 
fundamental Marxian concept for understanding capitalism, and Fuchs describes it well in the 
paper. In the process of capital accumulation, Fuchs states, “surveillance is the central method of 
control and discipline” (7). By Fuchs’s analysis, surveillance is an important gear in the cycle of 
accumulation. While Fuchs discusses several categories of surveillance, the relevant forms are 
“Workplace surveillance,” surveilling the labor force in the workplace, and “Workforce 
surveillance,” surveilling the productivity of workers (8). In Figure 5, these forms of surveillance 
fall under the sphere of production, labeled P, which signifies the purpose of these types of 




interests. As a brief aside, the terminology “workplace surveillance” or “management 
surveillance” has been used throughout this thesis, and this usage encompasses both terms 
described by Fuchs for simplicity. Fuchs goes on to define these types of surveillance with more 
detail. Workplace surveillance involves “the surveillance of spaces where work is conducted to 
ensure that workers conduct the duties that have been assigned to them” (9). This form of 
surveillance encompasses activities such as Amazon item scanners notifying employees when 
they fall below that day’s rate or the looming threat of termination when drivers deviate from 
Uber’s predetermined path. Workforce surveillance is “the surveillance of activities of 
employees” (9). Measurements of productivity, performance, and speed are relevant to this form 
of surveillance, which, again, can be seen in Amazon and Uber’s respective task completion 
tracking as well as location tracking. These forms of surveillance, as Fuchs describes, are central 
to the sphere of production in any capitalist corporation. In both Amazon and Uber, as described 
in the results, these forms of surveillance are prominent and are used to meet the goals capital 
accumulation. 
With Fuch’s understanding of surveillance as a tool for capital accumulation, the 
similarities between Amazon’s and Uber’s surveillance practices can be further explained. Both 
are capitalist corporations and, by their definition, are committed to maximizing shareholder 
value (i.e. profits, the accumulation of capital). The model of capital accumulation is inherent to 
the capitalist corporation, which is the primary underlying similarity between Amazon and Uber.  
 
Implications of Similarities between Amazon and Uber 
As seen in different methods of surveillance at both Amazon and Uber, their purposes 
match what Fuchs is describing with capital accumulation and Workplace/Workforce 




expectations in the respective firm’s attempt to maximize surplus value generated by the worker. 
This is an exploitative process, natural to the capitalist corporation. Fuchs also mentions, 
“surveillance as an aspect of the struggle between labour and capital,” quoted from a separate 
paper and signifying the role of surveillance as a check on the conflicting class interests in the 
workplace (3). In both Amazon and Uber, surveillance is an important tool for fostering capital 
accumulation according to predetermined standards and maintaining a submissive class hierarchy 
in the modern corporation. 
 The underlying similarities in the goals between Amazon and Uber go deeper than their 
organizational structures. Based on this theoretical approach, any capitalist corporation would 
employ similar surveillance tactics, altered to fit the context but ultimately for the same 
purposes. Surveillance in these settings, as seen in Amazon and Uber, is used to bolster 
performance and maximize production, utilizing algorithms to determine optimal task 
completion and more as previously described. Surveillance is a tool for the capitalist corporation. 
 Existing literature on surveillance aims to address the associated negative effects on 
workers; however, surveillance is often framed as the key problem, which is arguably incorrect. 
Surveillance is a symptom of the fundamental characteristics of corporations under capitalism. 
With an enhanced theoretical understanding of the similarities between Amazon and Uber, 
addressing surveillance and its side effects must account for the origin: capital accumulation. If 
surveillance were to vanish from workplaces, the goals of the capitalist corporation would 







 This paper is largely based on a qualitative and theoretical analysis of descriptive features 
of workplace surveillance. While the insights discovered throughout the process have meaning, 
the evidence is not as strong as it could be. Reaching a conclusion on whether or not 
organizational structure influences workplace surveillance is not easy to achieve quantitatively. 
The lack of empirical, quantitative results dampens the arguments made in the discussion portion 
of the paper; however, the theoretical analysis in and of itself cannot be discounted. Additionally, 
only two companies were studied, both of which come from the same broader industry. Amazon 
and Uber are cornerstone corporations in the present tech industry, and while their organizational 
structures differ greatly, similarities in surveillance practices could be linked to their shared 
industry. Future research into quantitative evaluations of surveillance comparisons, expanding 
the number of companies analyzed, and drawing comparisons across industry and historical time 
period would be beneficial for further conclusions on organizational structure and surveillance. 
 
Future Research 
 Beyond accounting for current limitations, further research into addressing workplace 
surveillance should tackle approaches to solutions. As outlined in the discussion section, this 
paper’s results imply that surveillance should be framed as a symptom of a deeper problem 
rather than the end-all-be-all. Existing solutions primarily consist of legislation that limits 
surveillance capabilities, regulations corporate power, and strengthening unions (Hanley and 
Hubbard, 2020, pp. 14-19). These solutions, in the abstract, are generalized and do not explicitly 




difficult to achieve as they require mass collective action and overcoming corporate power and 
propaganda in politics and society. 
 The latter two types of solutions are relevant to recent actions by Uber and Amazon, 
which showcase the difficulty of these approaches. To counteract support for former California 
legislation classifying Uber drivers as employees, Uber enabled a massive campaign to overturn 
the measure via the 2020 Proposition 22 in California vote. As part of this campaign, Uber 
coerced drivers into showing support for the campaign by requiring the usage of Yes on Prop 22 
labeling, and the app bombarded users with notifications in support of Prop 22 (Ongweso Jr., 
2020 and Press, 2020). Uber’s propagandistic campaign yielded great success, and, written into 
the law, Prop 22 requires a seven-eighths legislature approval in order to be modified (Press, 
2020). This is emblematic of the difficult road ahead for gig workers to support and encourage a 
vote for regulations on their employers. Similarly, Amazon ran a widely public effort against the 
unionization of employees in Bessemer, Alabama. Amazon used propaganda, in a similar way to 
Uber, to encourage workers to vote against unionization (Thornton, 2021). The company went as 
far as creating fake social media accounts in an attempt to convince broader society that working 
at Amazon was not as horrible as employees described (Hao, 2021). At the same time, Amazon 
(initially) publicly denied accounts of Amazon workers regarding their inability to take bathroom 
breaks in-warehouse or while on delivery runs, resulting in urinating or defecating in 
automobiles, diapers, or on the warehouse floor (Picchi, 2021 and Liao, 2018). Nonetheless, the 
unionization vote at Amazon’s Bessemer warehouse failed, and while there are ongoing 
investigations into the legality of Amazon’s actions during the vote, the fight for warehouse 




improvements could be achieved through federal legislation, the process would, again, require 
mass mobilization and convincing of politicians to even consider a vote. 
In both companies, we see a large technology firm strongly opposed to workers 
empowering themselves and fighting for better conditions and benefits. Existing attempts at 
solutions could help workers see better conditions in the future; however, there is an immediate 
need for relief, and recent attempts show that most general solutions will take far too long to 
realize. So where could the fight go from here? New strategies that can improve working 
conditions and job statuses for drivers and warehouse workers alike is an important focus for 
surveillance research and dialogue with workers and organizers. Building a collective effort is 







 Amazon and Uber mostly employ two distinct groups of workers: centralized warehouse 
workers and decentralized gig drivers. Yet, methods of surveillance experienced by these 
workers are largely the same. As capitalist corporations, Amazon and Uber share common goals 
for capital accumulation, and both groups of workers have conflicting goals for better working 
conditions and compensation, characteristic of the struggle between labor and capital. With this, 
surveillance can be viewed as embedded within the capitalist corporation, especially in the cases 
of Amazon and Uber. Working toward improvements for workers and dismantling surveillance 
requires an acknowledgement of the strong roots that these corporations grow from. While more 
research into methods of surveillance across different corporations is necessary, this paper yields 
an important analysis for contextualizing and crafting the fight of the future. 
The goal of this paper was to contribute to questions regarding workplace surveillance, 
provide a case study on differences and similarities between corporations with different 
organizational structures, and support further research into alternative approaches to “solving” 
surveillance. Hopefully, a deeper understanding of corporate similarity can inform future work, 
but there is much left to be researched with regards to workplace surveillance and how 
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